Introduction 1
In the absence of a general Community competence for the harmonisation of national procedural rules, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing the actions intended to enforce the rights which individuals derive from Community law. The EC is thus based upon a decentralised system of enforcement, in which Community law is mainly applied by national authorities and adjudicated upon by national courts according to the rules of national procedural law. However, in order to ensure a minimum degree of uniformity in the enforcement of EC law and to guarantee the 'effet utile' of Community law, the ECJ has, on numerous occasions, intervened into national procedural rules. 2 In particular, by using the tools of equivalence and effectiveness, the ECJ has been setting reference points and minimum standards. 3 The national rules have to comply with these standards and, in cases in which the national remedies fall below the level of protection which the ECJ deems acceptable, the disapplication powers of national adjudicative authorities is triggered.
As a potential consequence of the existence of European standards of protection, a process of convergence may occur, namely a process of change towards an increasing similarity of the legal systems. More strikingly, however, this process of convergence may occur beyond the initial boundaries of 'European situations', and through the voluntary adoption of Community standards by the Member States. This voluntary adoption of Community standards in the legal order of the Member States takes place when the national courts of the Member States apply, on a voluntary basis, the standards set out in the ECJ's case law in purely domestic cases, or when the national Parliaments of the Member States enact new pieces of legislation that comply with such standards. In this way the Member States avoid the creation and maintenance of two different sets of rules and judicial protection for national and Community law matters, and thereby avoid the possibility of reverse discrimination when the Community standards offer a higher level of protection. 4 Earlier research 5 has shown, however, that, of five procedural areas analysed 6 in three legal systems, 7 an increased similarity, induced by the ECJ's case law, can only be detected in two legal systems with regard to the procedural rules on interim relief. The situation, therefore, still remains that national procedural rules remain different. The cause of these enduring procedural differences has been traced back to the ECJ's attitude, which appears to be tolerant of national differences. In some procedural areas, the ECJ has merely imposed the scrutiny of national courts on the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness. 8 4 As Schwarze points out, 'such a situation not only puts significant strains on the personnel working for the administration who, at least partly, need to apply European and national administrative law simultaneously, but it would also be increasingly difficult to explain such a strict separation to the citizens of the EU who are subject to these separate regimes'. See J. Schwarze National courts, therefore, are not required to follow one single model advanced by the ECJ. The consequence of this minimalist intervention by the ECJ is that, in the areas analysed, although all are in compliance with the ECJ's case law, different procedural rules apply. Although the phenomenon was not detected for the procedural areas and the legal systems examined, it should not be overlooked that other reasons for the existence of different procedural rules might also lie in the national courts' ignorance of or disregard for the relevant ECJ's case law, 5 M. Eliantonio, Europeanisation of Administrative Justice? The influence of the ECJ's case law in Italy, Germany and England (Groningen 2008), in particular Chapter 5. 6 The rules that have been analysed concern:
(i) rules concerning the possibility of bringing a claim for the judicial review of an administrative measure; (ii) rules setting out time limits within which to challenge the administrative action; (iii) rules limiting the powers of national courts to raise ex officio grounds of unlawfulness of an administrative measure based upon the violation of EC law; (iv) rules setting out the means of evidence available to administrative courts; and (v) rules concerning the power of administrative courts to provide interim relief and the types of interim measures that can be granted. 7 Namely, Italy, Germany and England. 8 or in the fact that the question of the compliance of certain national procedural rules with EC law is not submitted to the ECJ.
The issue which this article endeavours to analyse is whether, for the purposes of ensuring an adequate, complete and effective judicial protection to individuals deriving rights from EC law, and a uniform application of Community law throughout the Union, it would be advisable for the European legislator to enact measures containing the procedural rules that need to be applied by national administrative courts when they are adjudicating upon EC law, or whether the effective enforcement of Community law in national courts can still be safeguarded by the requirements imposed by the ECJ's case law. This question is closely connected to that concerning the existence of a legal basis for the European Community to harmonise national procedural law: in other words, before examining whether a harmonisation of procedural administrative law by the Community legislature is desirable, one needs to first check whether, at present, the enactment of such harmonising measures would be at all possible. This question, in turn, raises doubts as to which legal instrument would be best suited to contain rules for the harmonisation of procedural rules.
2.
The Need for Harmonisation of the Rules for the Decentralised Enforcement of Community Law
The Possibility and Desirability of Harmonised Procedural Rules Applicable to the Judicial Review of Administrative Action
Before investigating the arguments concerning the desirability of a harmonisation of the rules for the decentralised enforcement of Community law, the question of the possible legal bases of the Community action must be addressed. As is well known, pursuant to the principle of conferral, enshrined in Article 5 EC, the Community is only empowered to act within the competences conferred upon it by the Treaty.
With regard to a procedural harmonisation, it must be pointed out that there seems to be no general competence enshrined in the EC Treaty for the Community to act, so that a Community legislative competence may be exercised only within specific sectors, such as agriculture and customs cooperation. The latter area, for example, has undergone a process of codification which resulted in the enactment of the Community Customs Code, the first comprehensive compilation of rules for the entire field of Community customs law.
is at least questionable whether this article could constitute a correct legal basis for the harmonisation of administrative procedural law: 12 the choice of this legal basis would, indeed, need to be justified, namely, one would need to show how the rules on the administration of justice have as their object, among other things, 'the establishment and functioning of the internal market', and that the national differences between these rules somehow impair the proper functioning of the internal market.
The common feature of Article 95 and Article 65 EC is the reference to the functioning of the internal market, 14 the disruption of which would justify procedural harmonisation measures. Thus, in order to decide upon the necessity of EC harmonisation measures in the field of procedural law, one has to estimate the negative effects which judicial remedies, which differ from State to State, create for European integration. In particular, one has to analyse the influence of divergent judicial remedies in the Member States on the internal market of the European Community. If, for example, procedural differences would cause business actors to reduce their business in a certain Member State because of the difficulty that they might encounter in enforcing their EC rights, then one could argue that competition in the European Community might be distorted and harmonising measures might prove necessary. 16 In other words, if one could demonstrate that the direct effect of substantive EC law might be at risk and market competition would not take place on equal terms, unless at least some minimal requirements concerning procedure were upheld in all Member States, then there would be adequate grounds to support the introduction of harmonised remedies in national courts.
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This argument is based upon the idea that, since there is a firm connection between procedural law and substantive law, the outcome of a case may often be considerably affected by the applicable procedural rules.
Two examples illustrate this argument. The first concerns time limits: after the expiry of a limitation period provided for by law, the enforcement of the rights of individuals is blocked. This means that different rules on limitation periods and on the powers of the courts to admit late claims may influence the chances of success of a claim in the various Member States. Along the same lines, one can think of an example based upon the rules of evidence: the chances of success of a claim depend, to a large extent, on the judge's conviction regarding the facts of the case. Consequently, national rules concerning the means of evidence that can be admitted in certain judicial proceedings and the powers of the judge to find facts ex officio may have decisive consequences for the outcome of the dispute.
In the light of this argument, one could maintain that different procedural rules concerning the enforcement of EC rights before national administrative courts might induce business actors to reduce their business in the Member States where administrative procedural law is restrictive and where it offers them low chances of success in cases in which they need to bring a claim before a court against the national authorities. This, in turn, might lead to a distortion of competition within the EC, which could be remedied by issuing harmonised rules for the decentralised enforcement of Community law by individuals.
The desirability of harmonised procedural rules, for the purposes of ensuring a smooth functioning of the internal market and a uniform application of Community law, has been advocated by some scholars. 18 As has been argued, even where the direct effect and supremacy of EC law are accepted and endorsed by the national courts, the uniformity of Community rules may still be jeopardised by the different procedural rules of the national legal systems. 19 As van Gerven has asserted, 'the need for harmonised legal remedies […] is inherent in the concept of uniformity: in the absence of (sufficiently) harmonised legal remedies, uniform rights cannot be adequately secured throughout the Community'. Others 17 In the light of this line of argumentation one could, indeed, conclude that not all procedural rules are as such a potential hindrance for the proper functioning of the internal market: in other words, in order for procedural differences to be regarded as an obstacle for the internal market, they must be of such nature that, because of them, market actors tend to engage in less trade in a certain Member State, so that the free movement rights might be impaired. M. Wolf, 'Abbau prozessualer Schranken in europäischen Binnenmarkt' 39-40. have asserted that the lack of uniform enforcement of Community law may lead to a disturbance of the competition conditions between the Community undertakings and distort the operation of the free movement of goods and persons. Community harmonised measures of enforcement could, therefore, secure a level playing-field for undertakings. Furthermore, from the perspective of individuals, the absence of uniform procedural rules may endanger the equal treatment of citizens -which is the very foundation of the Community itself.
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It is interesting to note that the necessity of harmonised procedural rules for the purposes of ensuring a proper functioning of the internal market has been brought forward by the Storme Commission in the context of civil procedural law. 22 The Commission considered why an approximation of civil procedural law would be at all necessary in the European Community and found the reason in the need to ensure the proper functioning of the common market. In particular, the Storme Commission argued that international businesses require an effective and transparent system of procedural law 23 and citizens an equal and fair access to justice, 24 and that these results could only be achieved if a harmonised system of procedural rules was set up. Secondly, the Commission argued that, under (former) Articles 3(h), 5, 100 and 100a (currently Articles 3(h), 10, 94 and 95, respectively) of the EC Treaty, the authority would exist to proceed to an approximation of procedural law in the Member States of the Community because of the very need to avoid the distortion of competition discussed above.
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Other arguments supporting the harmonisation of the rules for administrative justice are connected to the need for more transparency and legal certainty. In particular, it has been considered that the ECJ's case law on domestic remedies necessarily entails an ad hoc approach, which could be detrimental for the judicial protection of the rights of the individuals. 26 From the point of view of transparency and legal certainty, the benefits of harmonised procedural rules may be appreciated especially from the perspective of economic policy and competition. In particular, it can be argued that those participating in the economic life of the Community would profit, especially from an economic point of view, from a clear and transparent situation in which they would be able to enforce their claims against public authorities all over Europe pursuant to the same procedural rules. Additionally, codified rules for the enforcement of Community law in national courts may be perceived as being more 'legitimate' than the principles developed on a case-by-case basis by the European Court of Justice. On the one hand, the ECJ has, so far, been playing what could arguably be considered to be the role of 'motor of the European integration process'. On the other, however, it cannot be denied that the development of standards of protection which the national courts need to respect could be seen as an encroachment by the judiciary upon a function which should belong to the Community legislative power.
Furthermore, even if one accepted 'the creative role' of the ECJ in ensuring that minimum remedial standards are set, it cannot be overlooked that the ECJ's intervention can only be of a case-by-case nature. As has been pointed out, such an approach is dependent on the capacity of the litigants to obtain access to the national courts and on the willingness of the latter to cooperate. 28 In addition, one should not underestimate the inevitable influence of the factual circumstances upon the principles enunciated by the ECJ, 29 and the fact that the ECJ's analysis is necessarily limited to the procedural rules called into question by the national courts. This often implies that remedial rules that fall below the European standards of protection in a certain legal system may well be acceptable if examined in the context of another legal system which provides for mechanisms that compensate the 'shortcomings' of the rules in question.
Moreover, a legislative measure would, in principle, be an improvement vis-à-vis the process of setting minimum standards carried out so far by the ECJ, because the thresholds established by the ECJ have to be applied by the judges in the Member States, and this application may vary according to the judges' knowledge of, and sensitivity to, European issues. 30 Furthermore, Community institutions have no way of controlling the application of these standards in a systematic way. 31 In contrast, with harmonising measures, there would be clear rules stemming from the indications contained in the measure, which would make the commitment of national authorities more direct and incisive. 32 There are, however, several arguments against the harmonisation of procedural rules at European level. In particular, it has been argued that harmonising measures would entail the risk of a rigid and inflexible system, and would, therefore, contradict the evolutionary character of Community law. Furthermore, one could argue that the aim of ensuring a uniform and effective application of Community law might be in conflict with legitimate national interests, such as the need to protect fairness and efficiency in the administration of justice. For example, a harmonised measure contained a provision to the effect that arguments based upon Community law may be raised by claimants at any point during the proceedings before administrative courts, might increase the likelihood of EC law being effectively enforced throughout the Community. However, it might also endanger the fair administration of justice by granting the parties who rely upon Community law a procedural advantage over those whose rights are rooted solely in national law. 34 From this perspective, one could also maintain that a uniform set of rules for the enforcement of Community rights in national courts would create awkward problems of double standards of protection, which would give the national courts a hard time in trying to manage and maintain the integrity of the system. The difficulties connected to the existence of a double standard of protection could be perceived in an acute form and could potentially lead to unmanageable situations in cases in which it is impossible to severe the parts of the claim that are based upon EC law from those that are rooted in national law. 35 Another argument against the creation of Community-wide remedial rules is based upon the fact that such norms may be perceived as an extraneous body which might not fit with the legal traditions of the Member States. 36 This argument is based upon the assumption that legal systems are built through habits, customs and practices which dictate how law is going to be interpreted, 37 and that public law especially 'has particularly deeps roots inside a cultural and political framework'. 38 Closely connected to this argument is the perception that the possibility of achieving a common procedural administrative law in Europe is doubtful because the political conditions are missing. In particular, it can be argued that the legal systems are based on very different conceptions: in some countries there is no code, and there is no desire to have one; moreover, in some countries, there is no difference in the procedural rules between civil and administrative claims. These fundamental differences could make it extremely hard to agree, at European level, upon common rules which all national administrative courts would be bound to adhere to. 40 This point can also be found in Jurgen Schwarze's well-known publication, in which the national experts taking part in the research project were asked whether they thought that a codification of administrative rules concerning the indirect enforcement of Community law would be possible. All the participants discussed the advantages and disadvantages of codifying administrative procedural law and the question of whether and to what extent the Community is authorised to codify such rules. With regard to these issues, most of the experts have emphasised the great differences still existing between the administrative legal systems of the Member States: as Schwarze points out in his final assessment of the reports, 'the rapporteurs are obviously concerned that a general codification could be achieved only by reducing the requirements to the level of a common denominator, in which case it would prove as a barrier rather than an asset for an effective and uniform enforcement of Community law'. 
The Choice of the Legal Instrument
Even admitting that a legal basis for the Community intervention in this area may be found, and that legislative measures containing the rules for the decentralised enforcement of Community law would be desirable, the question still arises as to which legal instrument would be most adequate. In this respect, a directive would seem to be the most suitable instrument. Indeed, the latter, pursuant to Article 249 EC, binds Member States to a complete and immediate implementation, while leaving them free to choose the method and form in which to achieve the prescribed result. 42 Furthermore, a directive can be considered as having direct effect under certain circumstances in lack of implementation, and the incorrect or nonimplementation may give rise to State liability.
A directive was deemed to be the best instrument to achieve procedural harmonisation also by the Storme Commission. In particular, from among the hard law instruments, the Commission discussed the options of proposing a convention or a directive. However, the convention was regarded as not providing a sufficient degree of flexibility (in the sense of not enabling the national authorities to fit the remedies adopted into the framework of the internal regulatory system). 43 Consequently, the Commission opted for proposing a directive, in the light of its capacity to leave the Member States with the choice of the form and method in which to reach the result to be achieved. 40 In addition, one could also argue that an agreement on such rules could only be reached on such general and abstract terms that it is at least doubtful whether EC rights would then be more effectively protected in national courts. 41 J. Schwarze, 'The Europeanization of National Administrative Law' in J. Schwarze (ed.), Administrative law under European influence: on the convergence of the administrative laws of the EU member states (London 1996) 832. 42 From this perspective, a directive is to be preferred to a regulation, since the latter would impose uniform conditions to the Member States, thereby leaving them less room to adapt the European legislation to the national standards. A different solution can be seen in the possible adoption of a soft law instrument, such as the code of good administrative practice envisaged by Jowell and Bikinshaw in their report. 44 This solution would have the advantage of creating a more flexible and less invasive system, based upon voluntary compliance by the single Member States. Although it is doubtful whether it would immediately achieve the objective of a more effective judicial protection for the rights of individuals and a more predictable and transparent system, 45
3.
Conclusion the adoption of a soft law instrument in the field of procedural law might, at least, contribute to trigger a debate on the harmonisation of remedial law in Europe and on the creation of a common European frame of reference. This might, in turn, help the Member States to feel more involved in the harmonisation process, and ultimately induce them to implement the soft law instrument in their own legal systems.
In the light of the considerations made above, one can conclude that the choice between procedural harmonisation by way of a legislative instrument and a process of setting minimum standards of protection by way of judge-made law is mainly one between rigidity and flexibility. The choice for harmonisation would entail a more rigid system, in that all Member States would be obliged to adhere to the same procedural standards (for example, the European legislator would provide for a specific time limit within which individuals should bring their claims before national administrative courts when they are trying to enforce their EC rights). The current situation, instead, provides for a rather flexible system, in that Member States are free to create and maintain potentially divergent remedial provisions, as long as these provisions do not fall below the European standards (for example, the ECJ accepts that all national time limits are acceptable so long as they are reasonable, and they comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness).
In conclusion, it is submitted that the rights of individuals against the actions of the public authorities can be effectively protected even in the presence of different procedural conditions, as long as the control by the ECJ is carried out in such a way that an effective judicial protection is ensured, and national courts adequately comply with the ECJ's case law. This compliance is confirmed by earlier research which has shown that where the ECJ does take a clear stand in its case law, the national courts generally fulfil their role adequately as 'Community courts' in ensuring protection of EC rights. However, one must not overlook the fact that preliminary rulings can only be issued by the ECJ if a national court questions the legitimacy of a national rule. This means that, in some procedural areas, the ECJ's case law may not have had (and may not get) the chance to set 'European standards' of protection. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that national courts might be unaware of relevant ECJ's rulings, or might erroneously consider the ECJ's case law as not applicable to the cases upon which they adjudicate, thereby depriving individuals of an effective judicial protection.
Therefore, even though, in the current state of the development of the Community legal order, there does not seem to be a compelling need for uniform rules per se, leaving to the ECJ the task of ensuring that EC law is adequately enforced before national administrative courts might also be problematical, and sometimes even ineffective and inefficient. In fact, from a merely European perspective, one could argue that only remedial harmonising measures can truly guarantee a uniform application of Community law.
The only obstacle to such measures seems, at present, to be the lack of a legal basis: while Article 65 EC should be excluded because its scope is limited to civil proceedings, one could, in principle, envisage such measures to be based upon Article 95 EC. However, there is no evidence to imply that the procedural rules applicable before administrative courts do actually induce business actors to choose one Member State over another in the light of the more favourable remedial provisions. Thus, in order to resort to Article 95 EC, further research should be carried out with regard to whether and to what extent, the differences in the domestic procedural rules applied by the administrative courts impair the proper functioning of the internal market. 
